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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
D. C. WATSON and ANNA M. WATSON, I 
husband and wife; and LEON M. WATSON 
and BARBARA WATSON, husband and 
wife, 
Plaintiff and Respondents, 
vs. ~ 
DONALD M. WHITE and LA VINE H. 
WHITE, husband and wife, . 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11321 
This is an action by Plaintiffs-Respondents as sellers 
against Defendants-Appellants as buyers for specific per-
formance of real estate contract, and Answer and Counter-
claim for damages filed six years later by Defendants-Ap-
pellants. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon Plaintiffs' motion, and after full and complete argu-
ment thereon, the lower court entered its order striking and 
dismissing Defendants' answer and counterclaim and also 
dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek a judgment of this honorable court up-
holding and affirming the order of the lower court and deny-
ing the relief sought by Defendants. 
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for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or other-
wise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made 
to appear the clerk shall enter his default" (emphasis added). 
Nothing in the Rules allows a defaulting party such an ex-
tension of time and Plaintiffs submit that under this rule a 
party, by his failure to enter default, does not extend the 
time within which the adverse party may plead, particularly, 
as in the instant case, when the default covers a substantial 
period of time. 
Defendants urge under their Point I (pages 3 and 4 of 
their Brief) that the court could not properly dismiss Plain-
tiffs' complaint under Rule 41 (a) (2), URCP, and Defend-
ants' counterclaim under Rule 41 (b), URCP. Plaintiffs sub-
mit that Defendants' answer was stricken and the counter-
claim dismi.ssed pursuant to Plaintiffs' motion and said ac-
tion was not taken under authority of Rule 41 (b). Plaintiffs 
further submit that their complaint was dismissed only a.ft.er 
Defendants' answer and counterclaim had been di.smissed, 
and such action could properly be taken under authority of 
Rule 41(a) (2). 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISMISS IS AUTHORIZED 
BY THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE 
COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO HEAR THAT MOTION 
AND TO DISMISS THIS ACTION 
Plaintiffs' motion is not based on estoppel, but rather was 
intended to be, and was considered by the court as, a motion 
to prevent Defendants, under the doctrine of estoppel by 
laches, from prosecuting its claim against Plaintiffs. Argu-
ment to the court was upon this basis. 
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STATEMENT OF F.ACrs 
Plaintiffs agree with Defendants' statement of facts, ex-
cept to add that Defendants voluntarily gave up actual pos-
session of the subject property after about three monhs' oc-
cupancy, and have been out of possession since that time. 
Defendants have failed to comply with any of the terms of 
the contract and made no demands under said contract until 
the answer and counterclaim were filed in February, 1968. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR LN DISMISSING 
THIS ACTION 
Plaintiffs' failure to take default judgment against De-
fendants prior to the filing of the answer and counterclaim 
does not constitute an extension by Plaintiffs of the time 
within which Defendants could plead. The case cited by De-
fendants (Sanders v. Milford Auto Co., 62 U. 110, 218 P. 126, 
cited on page 3 of Appellants' brief) is distinguishable from 
and is not controlling of this case for the following reasons: 
(1) the defaulting party in that case was in default for only 
20 days before it filed further pleading, whereas in the in· 
stant case Defendants were in default for approximately 5 
years, and (2) the applicable statute in the Sanders case 
provided that default judgment may be had "if no answer, 
demurrer, or motion has been filed with the clerk of the 
court within the time specified in the summons, or such 
further time as may have been granted," etc. (Comp. Laws 
Utah 1917, Section 6844) (emphasis added). That section 
has been replaced by Rule 55 (a) (1), URCP, which reads 
as follows: "Entry. When a party against whom a judgment 
4 
Plaintiffs urge that under Rules 8(c) and 12(b), URCP, 
the defense of laches may be asserted by motion, and need 
not necessarily be asserted affirmatively by pleading, where 
the delay is apparent upon the face of the pleadings. 27 Am. 
Jur. 2d 721, Equity 175, and cases there cited. Also 173 
A.L.R. 362 and cases there cited. Inasmuch as the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure were fashioned after the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, it is proper to examine decisions 
under the Federal Rules to aid in the interpretation of the 
Utah Rules. Winegar v. Slim Olsen, Inc., 122 U. 487, 252 P. 
2d 205. 
Further, there is authority in the state courts that where 
the delay is apparent upon the face of the pleadings, the de-
fense of laches need not be especially pleaded. Phoenix Mu-
tual Life Ins. Co. v. Birkelund, 29 Cal. 352, 175 P. 2d 5; 
Hughes v. Leonard, 66 Colo. 500, 181 P. 200. 
The delays occasioned upon this case at the hands of De· 
fendants have caused considerable injury and prejudice to 
Plaintiffs in their case by reason of the fact that material 
witnesses have died and evidence lost. Defendants claim in 
their brief (page 4) that they desire to complete their pur· 
chase of the property made the subject of this lawsuit. Yet 
for six long years they sat by and did nothing regarding 
this property: they were not in any way heard from; they 
completely abandoned the subject property; they did ahso· 
lutely nothing toward complying with the terms of the con· 
tract; they have simply sat by and belatedly asserted their 
claim after Plaintiffs, in desperation, sold the subject prop-
erty to a third person, and, in in their minds, considered the 
case at an end. During this time the principal Plaintiff-the 
real owner of the property-and his attorney have both 
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passed away, they being the only ones representing Plain-
tiffs who knew all the details concerning the sale and the 
ensuing lawsuit. Defendants' delays have caused extremely 
serious hardships upon Plaintiffs in this lawsuit, and by 
reason thereof they should be precluded from asserting 
their belated claim at this late date. 
SUMMARY 
Rule 55 (a) (1), URCP, provides that default judgment 
may be entered against a party who has failed to plead or 
otherwise defend "as provided by these rules". Because there 
is nothing in the Rules which allows Defendants an extension 
of time and because of the length of time involved in De-
fendants' default, Defendants' answer and counterclaim 
should be disregarded and the case dismissed. 
Rule 41(b) has no application to this case, and the lower 
court properly entered its order dismissing the action after 
Defendants' answer and counterclaim were stricken and 
dismissed pursuant to Plaintiffs' motion. 
Plaintiffs' motion was not based upon estoppel, but was 
treated as and considered by the court as a motion to dismiss 
based upon estoppel by !aches. Such defense may properly 
be asserted by motion, and the court properly entered its 
order of dismissal upon that basis. 
The order of the lower court dismissing this action should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
John W. Palmer 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents 
